Ils l'aiment pourtant. Les biens qu'il admire ne lui appartiennent pas toujours. Mais il fallait bien montrer dabord une base solide de ce mode de l'art. C'est toute la vie sociale sous ses mille formes. C'est l'endroit de la paix. La nature est vide et le soleil consume : Piien n'est vivant ici, rien n'est triste ou joyeux. Ils jouent avec la campagne comme les enfants avec des sabres et des fusils. Mais nous sommes bien avertis qu'il s'agit d'un jeu. Et ce devint un lieu commun, que l'agriculture manquait de bras. Enfin il faut aussi tenir compte de l'influence pos- sible dans un sens ou dans l'autre de certaines habitudes sociales, des croyances philosophiques et religieuses.
Toutes ces actions varient beaucoup selon les temps, les milieux et les individus.
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Tous ceux qui 1. Les lieux les plus affreux me seront les plus doux. Des artistes comme Corot, Th. On ne sait pas. On ne peut rien affirmer. Et Ion croirait qu'il a failli le devenir. Vigny est un sensitif et un penseur, et il sent et il sait que la Nature ne l'aime pas, quoi qu'on en ait dit. Je dirai qu'ils sont beaux quand tes yeux l'auront dit. Viens donc!
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Mais ce n'est pas assez. Aimez ce que jamais on ne verra deux fois. Tous les tableaux humains qu'un Esprit pur m'apporte S'animeront pour toi quand, devant notre porle. Il y trouve des conditions essentielles de sa vie, il y trouve aussi des obstacles. Ils ne Paulhax. Roger-Miles, Corot. Auguste Pointelin. Mercure de France, 1" septembre Eh bien! Il nous donne la nature.
Et c'est ce qu'il faut exami- ner maintenant. Il est cela, il est aussi autre chose, il est moins et il est plus. Sans cela nous ne com- prendrions rien, un tableau ne serait qu'un jeu de couleurs et de lignes. Il est moins. Le peintre, pour nous rendre la nature, ne dispose que de moyens assez pauvres. Pour rendre la nature, il faut que l'artiste, en un sens, truque et triche.
Helmholtz, L'optique et la peinture. Vibert, La science de la peinture, Tout art est conventionnel. Mais cela ne se traduit pas comme on avait pu le croire. Et il existe aussi des anomalies de la vision. D'autre part regardez un Diaz, regardez un Hobbema, regardez un Boudin. Mais ici nous abor- dons un autre domaine, et je n'insiste pas. Le monde de Th. Parfois peut-on tout d'abord confondre l'un d'eux avec un cousin.
Et l'impression d'ensemble est souvent, au moins en partie, incommunicable, parce qu'elle ne peut s'exprimer par des mots. Je ne dis pas que nous comprendrons toujours pourquoi l'effet qui se pro- duit est bien ce qu'il est et non pas autre. Et ainsi de suite. La parole a. Gela est du moins fort vraisemblable. La simplification suppose un choix fait dans la nature. Et les naturalistes les plus convaincus n'ont pu s'en priver. Sans doute elle contient une part de vrai. Mais ce que l'art nous montre surtout, c'est l'expression de l'esprit de l'artiste, de 1. Paul Souriau dans r Imagination de Vartiste.
Et cela serait au moins aussi vrai. Il peut aller plus loin encore. Il s'agit, bien entendu, du paysage peint, non du paysage naturel. Souvent il lui donne bien davantage. Pour en discerner le sens exact, il suffit de lire le passage qui la contient. Amiel, Fragments d'un journal intime, I, Et pourtant le mot d'Amiel semble clair. Stuart Merril. Et sans doute ceci n'est pas absolu. Les grelots des troupeaux palpitaient vaguement. Et encore quelques-uns du David de R.
Le symbolisme des saisons ne s'accuse pas moins. On surprendrait beaucoup de gens, je crois, en leur disant qu'en 5. Rappelons-nous encore le chant d'amour de Sieg- mund dans la Walkyrie. Encore un soir! Une rose d'automne est plus qu'une autre exquise. Par des moyens artistiques, intellectuels, d'une part, et, de l'autre, par des moyens techniques. Pourtant ni la mer ni la falaise ne sentent, autant que nous en pouvons juger. Mais ici d'immenses forces sont en jeu et elles se contrarient. Voir : Rodin. L'Art, entre- tiens recueillis par Paul Gsell, p. Un paysage, ai-je dit, est une conception du monde.
DE Vigny. Tombe, astre glorieux, source et flambeau du jour, Ta gloire en nappe d'or coule par tes blessures. Je veux parler de l'harmonie des lignes et des couleurs, de la composition, du balan- cement des masses. Mais elles le servent en bien des cas. Mais ce ne sont point les plus beaux paysages naturels qui inspirent les plus beaux tableaux.
Pointelin, par exemple, ou chez les impressionnistes. Cependant la composition a bien servi certains artistes qui lui doivent une part de leur gloire. L'exemple des Suisses nous y engage. Il en est surtout, semble-t-il, qui ne se livrent pas d'abord, ni tout d'un coup. Il la corrige toujours. Tout portrait, portrait d'homme ou de femme, de mer ou de prairie est une traduction. Et l'on fait r Bl!
Le souci de l'ordonnance n'est qu'un des moyens de transfigurer la nature. La transformation ne porte pas seulement sur l'ordonnance, mais aussi sur la forme et sur la couleur. Leurs peintures ne se ressemblent pas. Et c'est en ce sens qu'un paysage peint est une conception du monde. Et le pay- sage pur ne le servira pas moins, pour cela, que le paysage historique. Paris, F. Le style dans les arts et sa signi- fication historique. Je citerais aussi deux tableaux de M. Le paysage peut servir d'accompagnement plus ou moins heu- Paulhan. Emile Micliel. Et la peinture et la musique ont subi une transfor- mation semblable.
La composition y existe certainement, mais elle est d'un autre genre que dans la peinture de genre ou dans la peinture dhistoire. Je ne sais si G. Les personnages mythologiques dont K. Le chanl. Berlioz, A travers chants, pp. Les derniers mots ne sont pas en italique dans le texte. Ils ne vivent pas, ils sont un pro- duit de la vie humaine.
Pourtant n'allons pas trop loin. De nos jours encore M. Cela est grandiose et saisissant. Et c'est une.
Personne : la nature et le soir. C'est une halte dans la vie qui s'an- nonce. Allons au Luxembourg, entrons dans la salle qui s'ouvre au fond de la galerie de sculpture. Reculez de trois ou quatre pas, tout s'anime, tout vibre. Les paysages de M. Pointelin dans le sien. Albert Lebourg : Notre-Dame de Paris au prin- temps. Voici maintenant le monde de M. Le Sidaner : Soir d'automne. Cela est vrai. La mer monte, elle des-. L'air et les nuages, la mer, les falaises sont les seuls acteurs du drame. Et, pourtant, quelle signification humaine prend ce tableau pour l'homme qui le contemple, et quel sens de la vie universelle, mais quel sens aussi de notre vie!
L'expression est grande et forte. Mais elle n"est, en somme, ni plus intense, ni plus profonde. Certes, encore une fois,. Je veux dire seulement qu'il atteint, par d'autres voies, des cimes aussi hautes. C'est que, dans celle-ci bien souvent, tout ce qui accentue la vie, 1. Ils n'en ont pas moins l'apparence de la vie. Nous ne les connaissons plus sous cet aspect. Leurs combinaisons sont infinies et se renouvellent sans cesse. Les objets sont les formes fugitives que prennent, un moment, des associations de rayons lumineux.
Mais les tableaux. Comme aucun art ne peut tout. Rousseau, ni de Pissarro la noblesse de Poussin. Et nous aimerons souvent ce qu'ils nous donnent. Chintreuil ou Pointelin peuvent donner de ces impressions. Chez M. Roussel, par exemple, la conception physique du monde se complique, comme chez M.
Et la peinture de M. Ainsi nous connaissons en philosophie le sensualisme et le rationalisme, la morale de la raison et la morale du sentiment. La couleur Paulhax. Le plaisir de la vue n'est pour eux qu'un moyen, non un but. Et il s'est plu aux temples antiques. Puvis de Chavannes est un autre intellectuel.
On peut estimer aussi que l'art ne doit pas s'adresser surtout aux sens et aux senti ments, tout en les satisfaisant autant qu'il le peut. Hayem, vu aussi ceux qui res- plendissent dans les collections de M. Antony Roux et de M. Et d'ailleurs tous les groupes qu'on peut former n'ont aucune valeur absolue. Il nous montre, volontiers. Laprade aussi et quelques autres encore.
Voici, de nos jours, Cottet. Tout y est d'aplomb, bien en place. Rien de rude, rien de hautain, rien non plus d'excessif ou de grandiose. Et je parlerais ici de Chintreuil, de M. Et il est difficile de le faire entrer dans un groupe quelconque. Mme G. Ce manque de style est relatif toutefois. Les bons artistes ont toujours un style.
Le stvle est moindre, non absent. Et IM. Ce que M. Vollon est un excellent peintre. Ils ont peint admirablement, et ils ont fait, en lui donnant chacun la marque propre de son talent, le portrait de leur pays. Voir le bon livre de H. La douceur du monde de Lebourg n'est point la dou- ceur du monde de Corot. Dans les deux cas d'ailleurs, elles n'ont rien d'absolu. Il prend mille formes diverses. Sans doute toutes ses formes ne se valent pas. La conscience collect. Nouvelle psychologie animale. La philosophie affective. Essais choisis.
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Une nouT. Sens et Taleur de la vie. Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Esquisse d'une philos, de la nature. Le Dantec. Le chaos et l'harmonie universelle. Philosophie de Victor Cousin. Philosophie d'Ernest Renan. La morale dans le drame. Les croyances de demain. Dix ans de philosophie Le sentiment religieux en France. Art et psychologie individuelle. Avebury J. Paix et bonheur. Darwinisme dans les se.
La morale scientifique. Le Roy. XJ ne philos, nouv. Le Faust de Goethe. Esquisse d'une philos, des sciences. Parisot et Martin. E, de Roberty. Concepts de la rais, etlo'is de l'unie. Rogueft de Fursac. Philos, et science de la nature. Fragments sur l'hisl. Sur les apparitions, et opusc. L'intuition bergsonienne. Win ter.
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Le rire. Psychologie du raisonnement. Psychologie de la croyance. Essai sur l'hvperespace. C' Bougie. Les sciences sociales en Allemagne. Qu'est-ce que la sociologie? Socialistes et sociologues.
Pragmatisme et modernisme. Bases de la philos, naturaliste. La psychol. L'organisation de la conscience morale. Rationalisme et tradition. Psychologie du rire. Le sourire. Les causes sociales de la folie. Le mensonge. Mi II et G. Pages sociales. Enoansse Papus. Occultisme et spiritualisme. La philos. Sensation et mouvement. Les criminels daos l'art. Essai sur l'art cnntemporain. La tristesse contemporaine. Nouveaux essais sur l'art contemp. Essai sur l'individualisme. Le beau et son histoire.
Les limites de la biolocrie. Les lois sociologiques. Le darwinisme. L'intelligence et le rythme dans les mouvements artistiques. Paul Jaaet. La philosophie de Lamennais. Le fondem. La crise de la psych. Du tondernent de l'ioduclion. Etudes sur le syllogisme. La justice par l'Etat. L'optique et les arts. Lois psYctiol. Psychologie des foules. Lamarckiens et darwiniens. La philosophie de Nietzsche. Aphorismes de Nietzsche. John Lnbbock. Le bonheur de vivre. L'emploi de la vie. La philosophie de Hobbes. Les conditions et les limites de la certitude logique.
Le rationnel. La peur. La fatigue intellect, et phys. Les mal. Max IVordan. Paradoxes psychologiques. Paradoxes sociologiques. L'avenir de la race blanche. Le bonheur et l'intelligence. Croyance relig. Paterson Swift. Psychologie de l'invention. La morale de l'ironie. La logique de la contradiction. La phil. L'image mentale. Philippe et G. Le monde physique. L'imagination chez l'enfant. La logique chez l'enfant. Les jeux des enfants. Les savants et la philosophie. Comment naissent les mythes. La philos, de Schopenhauer.
La psychologie de l'attention. Socialisme et science sociale. De Roberty. Psychisme social. Rognes de Fnrsac. Mouvement mystique contemp. De la substance. L'optimisme de Schopenhauer. Le libre arbitre. Le fondement de la morale. Ecrivains et style. Sur la religion. Philosophie et philosophes. But at the same time each thing, in the distance in which its selfcoincidence is separated in order to coincide with itself, leaves behind its status as a thing and becomes an intimacy. It is no longer manipulable. It is neither body, nor tool, nor god. It is outside the world, since in itself it is the intensity of a concentration of world.
It is also outside language, since in itself it is the assembling of a sense without signification. The image suspends the course of the world This presence is a sacred intimacy that a fragment of matter gives to be taken in and absorbed. It is a real presence because it is a contagious presence, participating and participated, communicating and communicated in the distinction of its intimacy. Or else, in each of these possibilities, it is something other than the pleasant game of an encoded displacement.
But in this way it also communicates its visibility, which gives both the sense and the sound of the word, as well as the contours of a sort of indecency in poetic form. This is an echo of another verse also a decasyllable in a variant from the same poem: les mots massifs, les mots profonds en or the massive words, the deep golden words. Here it is poetry itself that becomes the matter of the image. For the image is always material: it is the matter of the distinct, its mass and its density, its weight, its edges and its brilliance, its timbre and its specter, its pace and step, its gold.
But matter is first mother materies comes from mater, which is the heart of the tree, the hardwood , and the mother is that from which, and in which, there is distinction: in her intimacy another intimacy is separated and another force is formed, another same is detached from the same in order to be itself.
The father, on the contrary, is a reference point and marker of identification: figure, not image, he has nothing to do with being-a-self, but with being-such-and-such in the homogeneous current of identities. The image, clear and distinct, is something obvious and evident. It is the obviousness of the distinct, its very distinction. There is an image only when there is this obviousness: otherwise, there is decoration or illustration, that is, the support of a signification.
The image must touch on the invisible presence of the distinct, on the distinction of its presence. The distinct is visible the sacred always was because it does not belong to the domain of objects, their perception and their use, but to that of forces, their affections and transmissions.
The image is the obviousness of the invisible. It does not render it visible as an object: it accedes to a knowledge of it. Knowledge of the obvious is not a science, it is the knowledge of a whole as a whole. In a single stroke, which is what makes it striking, the image delivers a totality of sense or a truth however one wishes to say it. This sense is infinite, and each variation is itself singularly infinite. Each image is a finite cut The superabundance of images in the multiplicity and in the history of the arts corresponds to this inexhaustible distinction. But each time, and at the same time, it is the jouissance of meaning, the jolt and the taste of its tension: a little sense in a pure state, infinitely opened or infinitely lost however one wishes to say it.
The image does not stand before the ground like a net or a screen. We do not sink; rather, the ground rises to us in the image. The double separation of the image, its pulling away and its cutting out, form both a protection against the ground and an opening onto it.
In reality, the ground is not distinct as ground except in the image: without the image, there would only be indistinct adherence. More precisely: in the image, the ground is distinguished by being doubled. It is at once the profound depth of a possible shipwreck and the surface of the luminous sky. The image floats, in sum, at the whim of the swells, mirroring the sun, poised over the abyss, soaked by the sea, but also shimmering with the very thing that threatens it and bears it up at the same time.
Such is intimacy, simultaneously threatening and captivating from out of the distance into which it withdraws. The image touches on this ambivalence by which meaning or truth is distinguished without end from the bound network of significations, which at the same time it never ceases to touch: every phrase that is formed, every gesture made, every act of looking, every thought puts into play an absolute meaning or truth itself , which does not cease both to separate itself and to absent itself from all signification.
More than that: each signification that is constituted for example, this proposition, and this entire discourse also forms by itself the distinctive mark of a threshold beyond which meaning truth goes absent. It goes absent not in an elsewhere, in fact, but right here. It is in this sense that art is necessary, and is not a diversion or entertainment. Art marks the distinctive traits of the absenting of truth, by which it is the truth absolutely. But this is also the sense in which it is itself disquieting, and can be threatening: because it conceals its very being from signification or from definition, but also because it can threaten itself and destroy in itself the images of itself that have been deposited in a signifying code and in an assured beauty.
That is why there is a history of art, and so many jolts and The Image—the Distinct. But again, and finally, this image is none other than the opera itself which is now reaching its end, the music that has just been love and tearing apart, and which expires by showing them, infinitely distinct in their distance.
Two assertions about images have become very familiar to us. The second is that images of violence, of the ceaseless violence breaking out all over the world, are omnipresent and, simultaneously or by turns, indecent, shocking, necessary, heartrending. These assertions lead very quickly to the elaboration of ethical, legal, and aesthetic demands and there is also now the specific register belonging to the arts of violence and violence in art , for the purpose of introducing regulations that would control violence or images, the image of violence or the violence of images.
My intention here is not to enter into the debate concerning such demands. Instead, I want to get behind the assertions themselves in order to interrogate what can link, in a particular way, the image to violence and violence to the image. If we can expect from our inquiry some clarification at least in our thinking on this matter, it will no doubt relate to the ambivalence that pervades, in a parallel and therefore remarkable way, our general sense of both terms. There is something good and something bad in both violence and the image.
There is something necessary and something unnecessary. It is as if there were constitutively two possible essences of the image and of violence, and consequently also two essences of the violence of the image and of the image of violence. It would be easy to list instances and configurations of these From there we will gradually discover the traits that will lead us to the image. Let us take an anodyne example, but one that testifies to violence in the sense of a violent temperament, or in the sense in which one becomes violent in the face of an objective constraint: namely, feeling the need to extract a recalcitrant screw by pulling it out with pliers, instead of loosening it with a screwdriver.
Violence does not participate in any order of reasons, nor any set of forces oriented toward results. It is not quite intentional and exceeds any concern with results. It denatures, wrecks, and massacres that which it assaults. Violence does not transform what it assaults; rather, it takes away its form and meaning. It makes it into nothing other than a sign of its own rage, an assaulted or violated thing or being: a thing or being whose very essence now consists in its having been assaulted or violated. From elsewhere or beyond, violence brandishes another form, if not another meaning.
Violence remains outside; it knows nothing of the system, the world, the set-up that it assaults whether it is a person or a group, a body or a language. Rather than compossible, it wants, on the contrary, to be impossible, intolerable within the space of compossibles that it rips apart and destroys. It is not interested in being anything but this ignorance or deliberate blindness, a stubborn will that removes itself from any set of connections and is concerned only with its own shattering intrusion.
But let us put this on hold: it is as the very figure and image of the outside that violence declares its irruption. This is why violence is profoundly stupid. It is stupid in the strongest sense, the thickest and most irremediable sense. It is not the stu It is the calculated absence of thought willed by a rigid intelligence. I am deliberately using the word twat, which is doubly violent: it is violent as slang, but also because of the obscene and invasive image that it evokes.
Violence does not play the game of forces. It does not play at all. Violence hates games, all games; it hates the intervals, the articulations, the tempo, the rules governed by nothing but the pure relations among themselves. Just as violence splits open and destroys the play of forces and the network of relations, so it needs to exhaust itself in its raging.
It falls short of power; it is beyond act. The violent person wants to disgorge all his violence; and he wants to disgorge himself with it. His force is no longer force; it is a sort of pure, dense, stupid, impenetrable intensity. A mass, gathering and shaping itself to strike, an inertia gathered up and launched in order to shatter, dislocate, and crack open. Just as violence is not the application of a force in conjunction with others, but the forcing open of the whole relation of forces, destroying it for the sake of destroying it—and thus a furious weakness—so violence does not serve a truth: it wants instead to be itself the truth.
In place of the established order, about which it wants to know nothing, violence substitutes not another order, but itself and its own pure disorder. Violence—that is, its blows—is or makes truth. Racist violence is exemplary. This face is denied truth. The truth meanwhile lies in a figure that reduces itself to the blow that it strikes.
Here, truth is true because it is violent, and it is true in its violence: it is a destructive truth in the sense in which destruction verifies and makes true. It is important to highlight the ambiguity on which all direct or indirect approval of violence feeds. It cannot irrupt without tearing apart an esImage and Violence.
This ambiguity is also the reason why one could speak of good and necessary violence, and of loving violence, interpretative violence, revolutionary violence, divine violence. It is a terrible ambiguity; we know only too well how it lends itself to all sorts of lies and confusions. But this ambivalence is without doubt constitutive of violence, or at any rate of its modernity,1 if modernity as a whole is defined by an effacement of simple oppositions and a transgression of boundaries. Central to this transgression would be, in particular, the penetration of being itself by violence whatever the name of being: subject, history, force.
However, difference seems to assert itself here with just as much force as does ambivalence. In the second case, truth is reduced to the mode of violence and exhausted in that mode, whereas in the first case, violence is unleashed in truth itself, and thus contained in it. The truth of violence both destroys and destroys itself.
It shows itself to be what it is: nothing other than the truth of the fist and the weapon. It is the kind that snickers, spits, and yells, that enjoys its display of violence enjoyment, for violence, is without pleasure and without joy; it feeds on the very image of its violence. The violence of truth is something completely different from this.
It is a violence that withdraws even as it irrupts and—because this irruption itself is a withdrawal—that opens and frees a space for the manifest presentation of the true. Once again, let us put something on hold: are there not, corresponding to each side, two kinds of image? There is, therefore, a proximity between the difference and resemblance between the two kinds of violence. A single principle governs the twofold allure of violence if violence is singular , or of the two violences if they can be called by the same name : namely, the impossibility of negotiating, composing, ordering, and sharing.
It is the principle of the intractable. The intractable is always the mark of truth. On the other hand: the intractable can be the opening of truth. The identity and difference between one kind of intractable and the other must be kept separate. But can this separation take place without any violence, if truth is what must bring it about?
Violence of violation or of desire? Some would have us believe that the two are interchangeable. That is why there is a certain erotic or pornographic register in which the image of violation of rape is so readily invoked. To say nothing of many other discourses on sublime or heroic violence. It is, however, impossible to confuse the violence of violation with that of desire.
The distinction between the two is blindingly obvious. Nothing can seek to be the truth immediately, without having thus already violated all possibility of truth. Conversely, nothing can seek the truth without having already been exposed, through this will or desire, to the outside from which truth can irrupt. The following question remains. If the violence of truth is without violation, would it therefore be without violence? On the other hand, if the term violence is justified here, how can we think the difference that cuts across violence?
To put it another way, we cannot do away with the ambiguity of violence, with a violent ambiguity that always returns and that can threaten the most certain distinctions. Where does violation begin, and where does the penetration of the true end? Where does it end?
What right justifies the violence of nations? What superior constraint imposes itself on their supposed sovereignty? Then there are the questions posed by the uncontrolled irruption—particularly via the Internet—of all sorts of aggression and incitement to violence, along Image and Violence. The list is truly endless. We are surrounded now by a massive, general question of violence whether it is legitimate or not, whether it is truthful or not , a question about all the spaces of authority and power, political or scientific, religious or technical, artistic or economic.
Violence is the ambivalent name of that which exercises itself without guarantor and without being accountable. It is the ambivalent name of that which defines, in all its problematic character, the habitus if not the very ethos of our world: one that has no other world behind or above it. If violence is exercised without responsibility to anything other than itself, without reference to any higher authority including, of course, when violence invokes such a moment of authorization and justification , this becomes apparent through the essential link that violence maintains with the image.
Violence always makes an image of itself, and the image is what, of itself, presses out ahead of itself and authorizes itself. It is this fundamental character of the image that should concern us, rather than the mimetic character that the doxa attaches, above all, to the term image. Even when the image is mimetic, it must fundamentally, by itself and for itself, count for more than an image; otherwise, it will tend toward being nothing but a shadow or a reflection indeed, philosophical antimimeticism treats the image as a shadow or a reflection; in so doing, however, this antimimeticism manifests its sensitivity to the self-affirmation of the image and to the affirmation of the self in the image.
If what matters in the exercise of a force is the production of the effects that one expects from it the triggering of a mechanism or the carrying out of an order , then what matters for the violent person is that the production of the effect is indissociable from the manifestation of violence. The violent person wants to see the mark he makes on the thing or being he assaults, and violence consists precisely in imprinting such a mark. Divine violence is the visibility of a thunderbolt or of one of the The violence of the law must make its mark in the exemplary character of the punishment.
The imaging trait or mark of violence comes from its intimate relation to truth. Violence has its truth just as truth has its violence. Now truth is also, essentially, self-manifestation. The image is the imitation of a thing only in the sense in which imitation emulates the thing:7 that is, it rivals the thing, and this rivalry implies not so much reproduction as competition, and, in relation to what concerns us here, competition for presence.
The image disputes the presence of the thing. In the image, the thing is not content simply to be; the image shows that the thing is and how it is. The thing presents itself. The German word for the image, Bild—which designates the image in its form or fabrication—comes from a root bil- that designates a prodigious force or a miraculous sign. It is in this sense that there is a monstrosity of the image. The image is outside the common sphere of presence because it is the display of presence. It is the manifestation of presence, not as appearance, but as exhibiting, as bringing to light and setting forth.
Force itself is nothing other than the unity woven from a sensory diversity. The aspect is in this diversity, it is the relation that extends between the parts of a figure; but the force lies in the unity that joins them together in order to bring them to light. That is what all painting shows us, tirelessly and in constantly renewed modes: the working of or the search for this force.
Under this force, forms too deform or transform themselves. The image is always a dynamic or energetic metamorphosis. It begins before forms, and goes beyond them. All painting, even the most naturalistic, is this kind of metamorphic force. Force deforms and so, therefore, does passion ; it carries away forms, in a spurt that tends to dissolve or exceed them.
The monstrous showing or monstration spurts out in monstruation. The image not only exceeds the form, the aspect, the calm surface of representation, but in order to do so it must draw upon a ground—or a groundlessness—of excessive power. The image must be imagined; that is to say, it must extract from its absence the unity of force that the thing merely at hand does not present. Thus the famous Handgriff the quick movement of the hand or, dare I say, the hand that claws [coup de griffe] by which Kant declares that we will not be able to extract the secret of imagination Now the object in general is nothing less than the improbable irruption in itself of a unity in the midst of a chaotic, general dissemination and the perpetual flux of a sensory multiplicity.
The image is the prodigious force-sign of an improbable presence irrupting from the heart of a restlessness on which nothing can be built. It is the force-sign of the unity without which there would be neither thing, nor presence, nor subject. But the unity of the thing, of presence and of the subject is itself violent. This pure image is the image of images, the opening of unity as such. It violently folds together the dismembered exterior, but its tightened folds are also the slit that unity cuts in the continuity of extension. The pure image is the earthquake in being that opens the chasm or the fault of presence.
There where being was in itself, presence will no longer return to itself: it is thus that being is, or will be, Image and Violence. One can understand how time is, in many respects, violence itself. Unity forms bildet the image or the picture Bild, tableau of that which in itself is not only without image, but without unity or identity. In presenting itself, the thing comes to resemble itself, and therefore to be itself.
In order to resemble itself, it assembles itself, it gathers and brings itself together. But to assemble itself it must withdraw from its outside. Therefore being is torn away from being; and it is the image that tears itself away. Thus when Heidegger undertakes to analyze the constitution of the Kantian schematism, the specific image that he invokes in order to make visible the image as such is at first, and without justification, the death mask. Image of the image, then—and even image of the pure image of the schema, since it is a question of analyzing the schema: the look in which there comes to be seen the unlooking face of someone who can no longer see.
The Gesicht face of one without Sicht sight , such is the exemplary image. He who is cruel and violent wants to see blood spilt. He wants to see the internal life principle externalized, with all its colorful and flowing intensity. He who is cruel wants to appropriate death: not by gazing into the emp Perhaps every image borders on cruelty. But once this world has been taken apart, once sacrifice is impossible, cruelty is no more than the extreme violence that closes itself in upon its own coagulation; and that coagulation does not seal any passage beyond death, but seals only the violent stupidity that believes it has produced death immediately before its eyes in a little puddle of matter.
Every image borders on such a puddle. The image cannot but have the duplicity of the monster: that which presents presence can just as well hold it back, immobile and dense, obstructed and stuffed into the ground of its unity, as it can project presence ahead of itself, a presence always too singular to be merely self-identical. The violence of art differs from that of blows, not because art is semblance, but, on the contrary, because art touches the real—which is groundless and bottomless—while the blow is in itself and in the moment its own ground.
Such discernment must reach into the interior of a unity—inasmuch as there is no ambivalence that is not sustained by a certain unity, if only an infinitesimal and infinitely fleeting one. The phrase to give oneself [se donner] can be understood in two senses, however. It is between these two senses, at their indiscernible limit, that the narrow blade of discernment must pass. Violence is always in excess of signs it is or it wants to be its own sign, like the truth that nullo egeat signo.
The image is also such an excess; and without doubt art can be defined in no other way, in the first instance, than as a transgression and a being carried away beyond signs. It exceeds signs but without revealing anything other than this excess, like an announcement, an indication, an omen—of groundless unity.
Or rather it is the revelation of this: that there is nothing to reveal. By contrast, violent and violating violence reveals and believes that it reveals absolutely. It is the exact knowledge of this: that there is nothing to reveal, not even an abyss, and that the groundless is not the chasm of a conflagration, but imminence infinitely suspended over itself.
Oh you, thieves of the authentic hours of death, Of the last breaths and of eyelids falling to sleep, Be sure of one thing: And our interpretation shall be: the angel that gathers together these stolen deaths is the poem itself. Concerning the representation of the camps or of the Shoah, one poorly formulated claim continues to circulate in the sphere of public opinion with particular insistence: either one is incapable of representing the extermination, or one is not allowed to do so. Either it is impossible or forbidden, or it is impossible and, in any case, forbidden or forbidden and, in any case, impossible.
On the basis of this indecision alone, the claim is already confused. The confusion gets even more difficult when attempts are made to establish connections with what we call the biblical prohibition on representation. Here is not the place to go looking for the written traces of these pronouncements.
We could recall many other episodes besides, ones involving other films or works of art. The discourse that rejects the representation of the camps is confused because its content is not easily circumscribed and because its motives are even less clearly determinable to say nothing of the fact that, in addition, the discourse is often enveloped in a sacred aura, a point to which we will return later. Is it, finally, a question of impossibility, or is it one of illegitimacy?
If it is a question of impossibility, so long as we disregard the question of technical difficulties, to what does this impossibility point? Does it have something to do with the unbearable nature of what is to be represented? The result is a slippage of the prohibition, whereby its jurisdiction—usually restricted to images of God—is extended to include images of exterminated Jews, then those of other victims. The death camps are an act of super-representation, in which the will to complete presence plays out the spectacle of the annihilation of the very possibility of representation.
The forbidding of representation is not necessarily—or better, is not at all—to be understood under the regime of an iconoclasm. Forbidden Representation. Although iconoclasm or the simple abstention from images, which I include here under this term was and in some ways still is one of the great traditions for interpreting the commandment articulated in the book of Exodus,7 it is by no means the only one, either in the Jewish tradition or in the various Christian traditions the same is true of the Islamic tradition, where, moreover, it should be pointed out that the commandment as such does not figure in the Koran but has been extrapolated out of it through interpretation.
However, this is not the place to take up a detailed examination of the question. I shall limit myself to highlighting a few of its features that are relevant to our purposes. Above all, however, it forbids the making of sculpted images the insistence on sculpture and on sculpting is striking, in all the texts related to the biblical corpus as well as those in the Talmudic and Hassidic traditions.
The commandment therefore concerns the production of forms that are solid, whole, and autonomous, as a statue is, and that are thus destined for use as an idol. In particular, it should consist in a well-built form: a stele, a pillar, or even a tree or bush. As well, it has several different names depending on the context and, although they are all translated into Greek as eidolon, most of these words do not, in fact, belong to the lexicon of vision.
Thus the idol is not condemned as imitation or copy, but rather in terms of its full and heavy presence, a presence of or within an immanence where nothing opens eye, ear, or mouth and from which nothing departs or withdraws thought or word at the back of a throat or in the depths of a gaze. Later on, Talmudic commentaries will specify that if it is permissible to paint—more than to sculpt— faces the question being limited to that which has openings. One must also be attentive to what simultaneously creates connections and disconnections within it, that is, to what joins the two motifs, but also to what disjoins them and to what provokes passages and divisions between them, which are more complex, more subtle, and more enigmatic than they seem.
If we are not mistaken either regarding the biblical prohibition or the Greek problematic, this double motif involves, on the one hand, the motif of a God who in no way challenges the image but who gives his truth only through the retreat of his presence—a presence whose sense is an absense, if one may be permitted such a shorthand. In one respect, absense condemns the presence that offers itself as the completion of sense; in another respect, the idea debases the sensory image, which is only its reflection, the degraded reflection of a higher image.
But then again, absense also opens its retreat onto the world itself, whereas the sensory image indicates or indexes the idea. What follows is a logic that is twice doubled, whose values exchange places with each other, contaminate and confront each other. First Christianity, then the art of the modern world will have been the sites of this entanglement—that is, if they are not one and the same place, in the end. It is the presentation of what does not amount to a presence, given and completed or given completed , or it is the bringing to presence of an intelligible reality or form by the formal mediation of a sensory reality.
The two ways of understanding it do not exactly coincide with each other, neither in the divisions they afford nor in their intimate entanglement. Granted, this is precisely what results when monuments and memorials proceed out of a will literally to bury in bronze or in concrete or in film the horror of the deportees, who are about to throw themselves onto the electrified barbed wire or who are delivered en masse to the gas and then to the flames.
I do not want, however, to give the impression that these works would be open to critique or discussion: in a sense, they eschew all aesthetic criteria as does the American television series Holocaust, which was aired some fifteen years ago, but in an entirely different sense. The strategy of the latter works involves expressing their embarrassment or disgrace at the same time Forbidden Representation. Thus what must be understood here and what we shall have to reconsider is not exactly the horror or the sanctity that we think representation would not know how to touch whereas, perhaps, no representation ever touches at all except at the extreme, which risks taking the form of a kind of grimace, a gesticulation, or an illustration.
More precisely, what is at stake here is the following: What the camps will have brought about is, above all, a complete devastation of representation or even of the possibility of representing, to such an extent that there is not even any way to represent this devastation or to put representation to its own test—to the test, that is, of making what is not of the order of presence come to presence.
We shall come back to this. The question of the representation of Auschwitz—supposing that it must be maintained in these terms as a question—cannot be resolved if, indeed, it can be at all through a reference, be it negative or positive, either to an extreme horror or to an extreme sanctity. Rather, this question must pass through the following one: What became of representation itself at Auschwitz? How was it brought into play there? The Shoah is, then, an ultimate crisis of representation. Saying this does not imply any abstraction or cold conceptual conversion here.
I will, therefore, move away from the perspective of the camps for a short time in order to consider the question of representation in itself. I realize that for some I am simply repeating banalities here—but even so, have we sufficiently scrutinized what is at stake in them? At this point, greater precision is needed: if I ask that one think the course of a history in the strong sense of the word and not only of distinct histories, that does not mean that I am claiming a strict historical necessity for Nazism.
Nonetheless, it is important that Nazism be denied the status of a monstrous accident that took place within history and to history, for one thereby cuts it off from every possibility of thought. Undoubtedly, this proviso is beginning to be recognized, but, nonetheless, its importance cannot be affirmed often enough. The simplest way to enter into the problematic of representation is by way of its name.
I have already alluded to it, primarily in terms of how it is understood by philosophy. For all that, however, it is not always easy to avoid confusions or debates, even within philosophy but this is also because the issue is itself constituted by the singular knot that both has been built up within our history and has built up that history, that has woven it and that has also bound and strangled it. The Latin repraesentatio is an accentuated preForbidden Representation. The psychological and philosophical usage of the term arises here as well.
At the intersection of the image and the idea, mental or intellectual representation is not foremost a copy of the thing but is rather the presentation of the object to the subject to say this otherwise: it involves the constitution of the object as such, recalling that some of the greatest debates of modern thought are crystallized around this nucleus, those of empiricisms and idealisms, those of scientific knowledge and sensory consciousness, of political representation and artistic presentation, etc. Representation is a presence that is presented, exposed, or exhibited.
It is not, therefore, presence pure and simple: it is precisely not the immediacy of the being-posed-there but is rather that which draws presence out of this immediacy insofar as it puts a value on presence as some presence or another. Representation, in other words, does not present something without exposing its value or sense—at least, the minimal value or sense of being there before a subject.
It follows that representation not only presents something that, either by rights or in point of fact, is simply absent: in truth, it presents what is absent from presence pure and simple, its being as such or even its sense or truth. It is on this point that confusions, paradoxes, and contradictions often come to be formed. In the absence that constitutes the fundamental characteristic of represented presence, the absence of the thing thought as the original, the only valid and real presence intersects with the absence that exists at the very level of the thing isolated within its immediacy; that is, it intersects with what I have already called absense, or sense inasmuch as it is precisely not a thing.
In a corollary manner, one could say that outside of the West, there is order based on signifying forces, whereas for the West there is disorder and quest for sense. Or, yet again: there are worlds configured into schemes of action, position, and force, and then there is our history, configured into schemes of presence and absence and of representation, that is, into schemes of schemes, drawings, traces and lines. The entire history of representation—that entire fevered history of the gigantomachies of mimesis, of the image, of perception, of the object and the scientific law, of the spectacle, of art, of political representation—is thus traversed by the fissure of absence, which, in effect, divides it into the absence of the thing problematic of its reproduction and the absense within the thing the problematic of its [re]presentation.
It is here that we find our crux, one might say, and this would be all the more justified in that the Christian cross is at the very center of all this: representation of the divine representative dying to the world of representation in order to give it the sense of its original presence. One Forbidden Representation. If, therefore, what is essential to representation is the relation to an absence and to an absense upon which all presence sustains itself— that is, upon which it exhausts itself, hollows itself out, radiates, and comes to presence—on what grounds could the representation of anything at all be subject to condemnation?
At this point we must return to the camps. My point of departure will be to contend that representation occupies a decisive place within Nazism and within its ideological and practical system. On one level, there is no need to dwell on the subject at length. More than that, however, it is a question of a world that could be placed before the eyes and given presence in its totality, its truth, and its destiny: a question, therefore, of a world without fissure, without abyss, without withdrawn invisibility. Furthermore, although I cannot dwell on it here, we must nonetheless not forget how an entire epoch called for and inaugurated such a role for re presentation.
Rather, what is involved here is the re presentation of a type The Aryan body is an idea identical to a presence, or it is the presence of an idea without remainder: precisely what the West has, for centuries, thought of as the idol. Either what is without image or the complete idol. Finally, it refers to nothing outside of its own conspicuousness, one that emerges from itself like the truth for Spinoza but that thus shows nothing outside of this very emergence.
In one sense, it is an exact replica of the monotheistic revelation, and that is, of course, no coincidence. You can, of course, comment in the language of your preference. La Ley federal dice:. O'Reilly Media holds a trademark on this image. O'Reilly has granted permission for Wikimedia, a non-commercial website, to use this image to refer to the Perl Programming language, portraying Perl "in a positive light.
I believe this image may be beneficial within Wikipedia's collection of articles on Perl. Is there somewhere within Wikimedia where images like this, with limited reuse permissions granted, can be submitted for inclusion in Wikipedia. The Wikipedia article on "Programming Perl" already includes a picture of the book cover, prominently featuring this camel image. I am aware of Wikimedia's preference for vector images, and have created a rather detailed SVG conversion of this image, that I would like to contribute to Wikimedia, if there is an appropriate place for it to exist.
What copyright laws do Getty images come under and when does the copyright expire? I'm asking specifically about this picture taken in the British Mandate of Palestine on November 14, The credit is given to "Fox Photos" but it's apparently owned by Getty Images. Is this picture considered public domain 78 years later? No FoP in France? Is it still under copyright in the US because unpublished, anonymous works have a copyright term of years from the date of creation, or is it in the public domain in the US because it was in the public domain in its home country as of 1 January ?
Or does the date of 1 January only matter in the case of published works? This file is licensed as "own work", but I'm wondering if it should be treated as a derivative work instead. The file also seems to be a re-upload of File:AlomarRetired. I found out that all pictures of flags and coats of arms of municipalities of Venezuela are on the public domain under the license. The work has been liberated of any type of copyright and cannot be patented: because it represents a Flag, a Coat of arms or another ensign of the Republic, of the States or of the Municipalities and, in general, of any Venezuelan entity of public character;.
Warning: it is necessary consider the following: The National Flag, and the Coat of arms of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela are the symbols of that nation, so must be respected by the Venezuelan people, and by the citizens of other countries. The good faith of its use is presumed. The texts of laws, decrees, official regulations, public treaties, judicial decisions and other official acts shall not be protected by this Law.
The copyrights of author and his successors have expired after 60 years counted from January 1 of the year following from the first publication. Sixty years have passed since the death of the author. It is a work made in collaboration, and sixty years have passed counted from January 1 of the year following that of the death of the last surviving coauthor. The copyrights of the photographer and his successors became extinct because sixty years have passed from the first publication of the work. Sixty years of its completion have passed and it was not published or registered during this period.
The time referred to in this article was counted from January 1 of the year following the publication or the completion, respectively. It is an anonymous or pseudonymous work, and sixty years have passed from the first publication or the completion of the work. It is a photo made by a professional photographer, and it was a transfer object during a labor relationship or professional contract and the employer or contractor liberated it.
It is a made edition fifteen years ago, or it is an edition and fifteen years have passed without being published or registered. Also the original work was published sixty years counted from January 1 following from its first publication. File is licensed as "own work", but this seem highly unlikely. There's a local version of the same file en:File:Naval Reserve Command. If the licensing of the Commons' file is correct, there's really no need for a non-free version. No source is given for the non-free version, but it looks like it the logo is official based upon this Facebook page and this archived version of the organization's official website.
File:Marcus Simaika Pasha The date of the photographer's death is not known. It was not published until its inclusion in a book published in New York in I presume it remains copyrighted for years p. That correct? There is a recurring rationale for soft toys that are not obvious merchandise, like say Mickey Mouse, and otherwise appear "simple", to be excepted from the normal interpretation for toys given in COM:TOYS.
This normal interpretation is that we follow the precautionary principle and unless a mass produced toy can be argued to be below the threshold of originality, we require evidence that it is not under copyright. The latter would be the case for homemade knitted figures where the photographer was the creator, or very old toys that can be shown as having expired copyright, such as toys you might photograph in a museum.
Both California and D. Storkk talk , 11 April UTC. Is File:Sky Horizon. The picture was also taken by the National Institutes of Health. Elisfkc talk , 11 April UTC. Surely this company logo is copyrighted and does not belong on Commons? The current use of it on English Wikipedia can definitely be said to be fair use. The user who uploaded it said it was their own work, but that seems to be false since it is a company logo.
In veritas talk , 12 April UTC. Any guess as to what File:Indian Head, Maryland. I noticed it after it was added to en:Talk:Indian Head, Maryland. A Google image search got a hit for a music video posted to YouTube for en:Natasha Bedingfield and the image looks like a screenshot from the mark.
I can't see how this can be "own work". The entire website of the group is licensed under CC-BY 4. However, as this is an organization logo, I want to make sure that I am not running into some legal issues I am not aware of. Is the current licensing okay, or would it be more appropriate to use the file under pd-textlogo or fair use? This could've been McCarthy himself, someone acting on his behalf, or someone who wishes to convey that appearance. Can we confirm that the copyright to that photo is indeed owned by Tmcc? Nightscream talk , 15 April UTC. I've no great desire to be credited for this adaption, but I don't want to 'step on the toes' of Ordnance Survey etc.
Any suggestions? Sionk talk , 17 April UTC. This file is licensed as "copyleft" under the "free art license", but according the the sourced website for the file lambdasigmagamma. This seems to contradict the licensing of the file. Does there have to be some indication on the source website that it's content is "copyleft"? File is claimed as own work, but it looks like it comes from here or here.